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Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
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www.gdnet.org 

























Conceptual and theoretical issues of foreign aid in post-conflict, transition region are 
discussed. Two examples are presented in an informal manner. The first is about the 
incoherence of aid for reconstruction and policies of transition. The second is about the role of 
expected institutional change that the process of European Union integration provides and the 
comparative role of aid for institution building. Hypothesis are developed that will be 
considered in the further work on aid in the Balkans. 
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1. Introduction 
  Most questions about the effects of aid remain without clear answers. Econometric 
analysis does not support strongly the claims either that aid does harm or does good (Rajan 
and Subramanian, 2005). Perhaps the most that can be gotten from the rather extensive 
literature on various aspects of the effects of aid on developing countries, and in other 
settings, is that if the conditions are right, aid can have positive consequences for growth, 
welfare and equality. When it comes to conditions, it seems that there is a growing consensus 
that everything works better, aid included, with good institutions (Burnside and Dollar, 2004). 
It is not clear, however, whether aid contributes to the improvement of the institutions over 
time or it is the case that good institutions should have already existed for aid to have made a 
positive contribution. Also, it is not altogether clear which are the institutions that should be 
improved and what does improvement exactly mean? In some studies, the institutions that are 
described include rule of law, those that support sound economic policies and good 
governance and then a question arises why would countries with all these good institutions 
need aid to finance their development rather than investments and other financing on 
commercial basis? 
  In this paper some conceptual and theoretical issues will be raised and those will be set 
against the recent experience of the Balkans. This is a region that has seen massive aid in 
various forms and from different sources. It is an interesting case because it is a post-conflict, 
developing and post-socialist region. The aid has been channeled together with significant 
international involvement in state and nation building. The donors have also had strong 
influence on the policies pursued by the aid recipient countries. The aims of the aid effort as 
well as the way that the aid was delivered had been changing over time too. This case can also 
be usefully compared with the other countries in transition both those within and without the 
Balkan region. 
  The paper relies on the ongoing work on the Balkans in areas of trade, investment, 
regional cooperation, transition and macroeconomic development and policy design. It is also 
a part of a set of papers on the effects of aid in this region. The other papers include two 
country studies, on Bosnia and Herzegovina and on Kosovo, and one comparative study. The 
final version of this paper will use the results of the other papers to check the claims made 
here against the findings in the other papers. The purpose of this paper is primarily to generate 
questions and hypothesis on the basis of the existing literature on aid and development and on 
the accumulated knowledge of the economic and political developments in Southeast Europe   3
or the Balkans. It is also intended to have policy relevance, which is why parts of it are 
framed in the format of “lessens learned”. 
 
2.1. Means and ends: a theory of economic policy framework 
  There is a difference between identifying a causal and an instrumental or policy 
relationship. It may be the case that a causal relationship between two variables is established, 
but the effect may not be a policy or any other objective while the cause may not be the means 
relied on to achieve any objective, aim or end. In other words, instrumental rationality may 
not be underlying the causal relationship that can be established: causes and effects may not 
reveal the relationship between means and ends (Heckman, 1999). 
  In principle, an instrumental relationship, i.e., a policy relationship between ends and 
means implies the existence of a causal relationship (though perhaps not in a simple way), but 
not vice versa. This is not to be understood, however, that every causal relationship has a 
policy rationalization. In other words, it is not the case that once a causal relationship has 
been determined a policy advice can be immediately formulated.  
More formally, let C be a cause and E an effect. Then an instrumental hypothetical (if 
an end, X, is sought, the means, Y, should be used) cannot be immediately established; i.e., it 
cannot be advised that if, for instance, a particular E was desired, C should be done, even if C 
is a decision variable. More generally, causal relationship does not generally have a policy 
rationalization. The relationship between a cause, C, and an effect, E, may also mediate the 
instrumental relationship. In other words, if Y is the means to achieve a goal X, that may be 
because it is supported by an underlying causal relationship which is independent of the 
instrumental relationship and would not by itself produce the desired goal. This is so even if it 
is true, as it should be, that a feasible instrumental relationship implies the existence of a 
causal relationship. It may be true that if X is desired and it is feasible to achieve that end by 
using Y, that will mean that Y is a cause and X is an effect. 
Two additional points are worth making here. One is that different causal relationships 
may support an instrumental relationship. In other words, policies can work in different causal 
environments or structures. The other is that from the fact that X produces Y it does not 
follow that other instruments could not do the same. Some may be infeasible given a causal 
relationship, but others may not be. Also, in general, with richer causal structures, feasible 
instrumental relationship for any desired goal may be numerous. From this it follows that 
various policy instruments can be substituted for each other. Thus, once the aim is chosen, the   4
instruments are not yet determined. This is even more so once various goals are targeted and 
the menu of instruments is available. 
These are rather simple, but perhaps important, points to have in mind when the 
research on the policy of aid is considered. An overview of some of the research in this area is 
a good illustration. 
 
2.2. An example: aid and growth 
  Most of the work on the effects of aid, at least in economics, looks at the issue whether 
aid speeds up growth or not (Easterly, 2006). This question is pertinent if the aim of the aid 
that was extended was indeed to speed up growth. For instance, aid to the health services in a 
country may not be usefully evaluated by checking the growth rate of that country. It may 
indeed be the case that building hospitals in a developing country will spur up growth (if there 
is a causality that works that way), but the aim of that aid project is certainly to improve the 
health of the population (which is the instrumental rationality in that case). Also, aid that aims 
to alleviate poverty may also support economic growth (if a causality exists), but even if it did 
not it would still be a successful project if it reduced the number of people living in poverty 
(which is the intended goal of the aid effort). Similarly, all the aid money that goes to 
improvement of education need not be justified by its contribution to the growth rate; it could 
be that the aim is to increase social equality or to make the distribution of opportunities fairer. 
It is to be expected that growth effects exist too given what we know about the way an 
economy works, but those are not the primary aims of these aid programs and thus should not 
be the basis for the evaluation of the success of these projects (Sachs, 2005). 
  This may perhaps be true of reconstruction aid in post-conflict societies in general. In 
the Balkans, for a considerable period of time, aid targeted security, stability and post-war 
reconstruction rather than economic growth. Initial growth rates were of course high, but 
proved generally not to be sustainable once the reconstruction was over and aid inflow 
decreased or dried out. That does not mean that the aid effort was not successful in achieving 
the goal that was primarily targeted, which was security, stability and social and personal 
welfare. 
  Thus, in order to evaluate a specific aid effort means and ends, targets and instruments 
should be clearly specified so that the judgments about the success or failure could be 
substantiated in the appropriate manner. 
  Another set of studies looks at the conditions in which aid is extended. If public 
governance is better, aid effectiveness of publicly implemented programs is higher. However,   5
aid is often being extended precisely because public governance in a developing country is 
poor. International aid also often goes to areas in distress, to those that suffer from social or 
violent conflicts, so the environment in which aid happens is often that of weak states. It is not 
self-evident why aid would be the appropriate instrument of development in the case of a 
country that has exemplary public governance. In the case of post-conflict states or regions, it 
is to be expected that public governance will be weak so for a considerable period of time the 
aid effort has to take place in weak institutional environments. 
  Thus, it is not only the issue of whether an instrument is efficient but also whether it is 
the one that is appropriate.  
In general, all policy instruments can be substituted, perhaps imperfectly, one for 
another. Theoretically, the claim that all policy instruments are substitutes in the general 
political-economy equilibria is perhaps a consequence of the theorem of the second-best. 
Assuming that it is feasible and desirable to reach a certain end, most every policy instrument 
could be effective in achieving the chosen end. In a sense, feasibility is a rather weak 
constraint. However, some instruments may be more appropriate than the others for a number 
of reasons. For instance, aid and investment are substitutes when it comes to infrastructure 
projects, but investment may be better than aid for reasons of efficient allocation of resources 
while aid may be preferred to investment for fiscal or balance of payments reasons. 
  Some studies look at aid as an instrument that should correct for certain other policy 
measures. For instance, it is sometimes argued that aid can be used as a compensation for 
distortions that exist in international economic relations. A good example is trade in 
agricultural goods. If a developed country wants to subsidize its agriculture it may also want 
to give aid to a less developed country to compensate its farmers for lost revenues from 
exports or indeed for being unable to compete with the subsidized enterprises. The end result 
would be that those who are less productive but are subsidized would be encouraged to 
produce while those who are more productive would be supported not to produce. That is 
clearly a quite distorted way to allocate resources though that may even be a Pareto-
improving outcome compared to the situation with no aid being given to the farmers in the 
less developed country. 
  The more general point is that aid that supports incomes that is often relied on in post-
conflict situations may interfere with the efficient allocation of resources. In the Balkans, for 
instance, massive inflow of aid with the aim of supporting social stability through subsidies to 
private incomes and public budgets has in all probability contributed to distortions in the 
labour and product markets. On the other hand, it is not altogether clear whether distortions in   6
the allocation of resources are the main concern of national and international authorities in 
post-conflict situations. 
  Thus, an instrument may not be used just because it is effective, in the sense of 
achieving a desired goal, but some consideration to the justification of the aims for which it is 
used should be given. 
  This interplay of various policies has lead to quite a number of studies that look into 
the policy mixes that enhance the successfulness of aid and jointly contribute to faster growth 
and to overall development (Gupta, Powell and Young, 2006). One issue that has been studied 
more than the others is the appropriate mix of aid and trade policies. There is no doubt that 
foreign aid will increase imports ceteris paribus. The effect, from the balance of payments 
point of view, is similar to that of investments. In the latter case, however, it is in principle 
clear what should be the appropriate exchange rate and interest rate policies. If foreign 
investments are to be increased, it makes sense to liberalize trade and then a flexible exchange 
rate with inflation targeting seems as the most appropriate policy mix.  
In the case of inflow of aid the policy mix may be more difficult to design. The actual 
policy mix that is chosen or could be recommended as being the appropriate one may depend 
on the reasons that aid is resorted to rather than investments, for instance. If, for instance, 
investments are not flowing in due to too high risk, than the trade policies that are appropriate 
may be different ones than those that are optimal for the free flow of investments.  
In some cases, foreign aid is combined with protectionism with the idea that the 
money should be spent domestically rather than on imports. That can increase wages and thus 
lead to the convergence of price levels with those in the more developed countries. 
Alternatively, tariffs may be lowered which may lead to growth of imports and eventually to 
addiction to aid. In both cases, there is a question whether it makes sense to liberalize current 
and capital account transactions in countries that are recipients of aid. This is similar to cases 
where there is significant inflow of remittances. If money is spent in the country, prices may 
increase leading to a problem with competitiveness. If not only trade but also financial 
transactions are liberalized, issues of monetary and exchange rate policies and ultimately 
fiscal policy need to be addressed. 
Thus, issues of policy design emerge that are similar though not identical to those in 
the cases of significant inflows of financial resources either as investments or as remittances. 
There could be a difference, however, between the design of the policy regime, i.e., of the 
rules on which various policies are based and the actual policies or the ways in which these 
rules and the attached instruments are being implemented in order to achieve the desired or   7
chosen policy objectives. The issue of policy design is of course broader especially in cases, 
admittedly the most common ones, when aid is being disbursed in countries with weak 
institutions or weak states, for instance in post-conflict situations. 
An example of problems with the policy design in the Balkan countries that were 
recipients of significant aid will be looked at in more detail below. The additional issue that 
emerged in this region was the need to implement significant institutional or structural 
reforms in the context of post-war reconstruction and of weak and rather non-standard 
institutions of public governance. Thus, aid was used for many purposes, for reconstruction, 
social cohesion, institution building and to support private investments. Thus, the issue of 
consistency between the aims of the aid effort and the policy design for transition has been the 
central one. 
 
3. Four issues 
  The short overview of the literature on aid turns up at least four important issues that 
could be considered in the context of any particular instance of aid flows. These issues are 
indeed research questions that could be asked in the case of the ongoing aid effort in the 
Balkans. 
  Aims and ownership: An implicit assumption in the studies that look at the impact of 
aid on growth is that the government of the aid recipient country is aiming to maximize 
growth (or some other goal that is in accordance with economic efficiency and social 
sustainability). Thus, a question naturally arises whether aid contributes to that aim or not? Or 
does it, unintentionally to be sure, subvert that aim and create an aid dependency or similar 
types of distortions? The answer depends in part on the issue of ownership that is increasingly 
taking centre stage in the normative literature on the design of aid. Clearly, if a government is 
aiming to speed up growth, it will seek aid that will be conducive to that aim. In that case, 
either aid will indeed contribute to growth or the aims of the donors will diverge from those 
that the receiving government has adopted. In other words, in this second case, there will be 
an issue of ownership. 
  If, however, a government does not aim to speed up growth, aid cannot be expected to 
contribute to growth, except unintentionally. Another possibility is that the donors will aim to 
speed up growth of the recipient countries, in which case they will condition the disbursement 
of aid on the change of policy agenda in the recipient country. In this case, aid would be an 
instrument of policy change in the country that is receiving aid. The effect of aid on growth 
may still not materialize because of the problems with implementation of aid projects in the   8
context of the conflict of aims and the lack of ownership on the part of the recipient country 
(Bauer, 1971). 
  Thus, the first issue: Who sets the policy objectives? 
  Weak states and aid: Another issue is that of when it is justified to disburse aid? Most 
aid goes to developing countries that often have weak institutions and, in the extreme cases, 
have weak states. In cases when aid goes to states with good institutions and appropriate 
policies, it can be expected that the effects on growth, or whatever is the objective in question, 
will be positive and perhaps even as strong as intended. It is different with countries that have 
weak states or weak institutions.  
States can be weak in a number of ways. Assuming that states supply two goods, 
security and justice,
1 they can be weak in case they do not supply one or the other of these 
goods or both. If, for instance, a state is in civil war or is criminalized, it will be weak even if 
it disposes of a lot of resources, e.g., it has a high level of public expenditures. Many 
developing countries have weak states in the sense that they do not supply the necessary level 
of security but also have low level of public expenditures. In the case of transition economies, 
however, a state may be weak because it is either criminalized or is not ruled by law or 
redistributes a lot of resources because it is run by rent-seeking special interests. In both cases, 
when states control little or a lot of resources, the weakness of the state will be indicated by 
the lack of the clear public will or rather of the legitimate way to aggregate public preferences 
and reveal policies that are in the public interest. 
  Thus, both institutions may be weak and policies may not be geared towards the public 
good, in which case the state, irrespective of the level of resources that it has the command 
over, will be weak. It is mostly in those cases that aid is used to achieve certain policy 
objective. Those should, in principle, target the supply of precisely those public goods that the 
state itself is not supplying or is undersupplying, i.e., security and justice. In these cases, 
development may be more of an instrument than the target of the flow of aid. This is to a large 
extent the target of aid to the Balkans. 
  The second question is: Are the instruments chosen justifiable given the conditions in 
which aid policy is implemented? 
  Aid and other instruments: In cases in which aid works, other types of financing may 
work also. If a country has strong institutions and pursues right policies, investments should 
work as well as aid. If it is the case that public investment will be undersupplied, that could be 
                                                 
1 Justice here covers not only legal but also social justice. Thus, not only rule of law but equality is what a state 
supplies as justice. Similarly, security should be understood in the more general social sense rather than in the 
narrow political sense.    9
substituted with public investments. Again, aid is mostly an instrument of choice if 
investments are not forthcoming either because the risks to private investments are too high or 
the state is broke and cannot invest public resources. 
  The interesting case is that of remittances, which tend to be high in the countries that 
are also recipients of foreign aid. If remittances go to private consumption rather than 
investment, it may be that there are no profitable investment opportunities for variety of 
reasons. There are cases still when private investments are significant, but there is still the 
need for foreign aid to spur development. Clearly, in these cases, the state is weak because it 
either does not raise enough revenues or misallocates them. 
  In the case of a poor country with good institutions and appropriate policies, the 
reliance on aid rather than on other types of financing may be desirable because of the 
different ways they affect the balance of payments. High inflows of foreign aid have been 
connected with an overvalued exchange rate, but the same has been observed with remittances 
and foreign investments. The effect should be smaller in cases when the inflow of foreign 
resources is used to import goods and services rather than to buy non-tradable goods and 
services at home. 
  The third question is: Is reliance on foreign aid consistent with sound economic 
policy? 
  Aid and legitimacy: Assuming that aid flows to countries with weak states, there is an 
issue of legitimacy to be considered. Even if the ownership issue is solved in some way, the 
principal-agent relationship is not necessarily a clear cut and transparent one. Even if aid 
comes with no strings attached, i.e., without explicit conditions on how it is to be used, it may 
severe the natural relation of responsibility in a country. If public investments do not come 
from the budget but from foreign aid, the public may not have the needed incentives to control 
the way the government spends the money. 
  The forth issue is: Does aid support or distort institutions of public governance? 
  The two latter issues refer to distortions that aid may be associated with. One is 
connected with market allocations and the other with sound public governance, in particular 
with sound public financing. Resources may be misallocated through aid because markets do 
not mediate in the allocation decisions. Thus, if the same aim could be achieved with private 
investments and with aid, investments should be preferred because they are allocated through 
markets and thus on the basis of markets prices. In the case that private investments are not 
forthcoming, public investments could be the substitute, but their efficiency depends on the 
quality of public governance. That means that there is a responsible, transparent and   10
responsive fiscal system. Aid is usually relied on when such a system does not exist with the 
consequence that it cannot be expected that aid will contribute to its establishment or 
development. Thus, problems with misallocation of resources are almost unavoidable in cases 
in which aid is most needed. 
 
4.1. Aid and policies: Lessons learned from the Balkan example 
  One of the questions mentioned above is that of the consistency of policies of aid and 
the overall policies a country that is receiving aid is pursuing. In some cases, the Balkans 
being such case, aid donation is conditional on the adoption of certain institutional 
arrangements and policies.  Thus, a country that receives aid is also a policy taker. The policy 
makers are the aid donors. The Balkan example shows that this relationship is not all that 
simple and the effects are not straightforward. Here a stylized description of the policies 
pursued in the Western Balkans will be given. 
Current state of affairs in the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, with Kosovo being a special case), which has 
been the recipient of significant aid, is the outcome of the violent conflicts in the post-socialist 
transition. The international reaction and intervention has aimed to pacify and stabilize the 
region. In that, it relied on the following overall policy framework: 
(i)  an introduction of a constitutional provisorium,  
(ii)  the adoption of the politics of ambiguity, and  
(iii)  on aid and other financial incentives to steer the development towards more 
stable and permanent political and economic structures. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina provides the most typical case. Constitutional structure was 
imposed that lacked both legitimacy and functionality. Those were to be substituted for by 
heavy international involvement with both political and economic powers. Finally, aid was to 
lead to speedy reconstruction while very fast liberalization and privatization were to bring in 
incentives for both state building and development.  
In a nutshell, benevolent international dictatorship and free markets were to lead to 
spontaneous emergence of democracy and market economy. The latter two would then 
resolve the constitutional issues (Gligorov, 1995). 
Similar strategy has been applied to Kosovo and to an extent to Serbia and 
Montenegro. Somewhat different approach was applied to Croatia, Macedonia and Albania, at 
least eventually. In these latter cases, there was more explicit reliance on democratic   11
procedures and on the respect for human rights. These experiences lead to the following 
lesson: 
Lesson 1. Legitimate, democratic, authority is needed for institution-building as well 
as for liberalization and privatization – spontaneous market and political forces will not 
manage an institutional transformation in political provisoria. 
 
4.2. Aid, conditionality and economic repression 
  The experience of transition in the Balkans provides for a useful comparison between 
the countries of Eastern Balkans, Romania and Bulgaria, that did not rely on aid and those in 
the Western Balkans that did. There are similarities in the choice of economic policies, but the 
institutional and international context is rather different. The main difference is that Eastern 
Balkan countries operated with the European Agreement while the Western Balkan countries 
lacked the European anchor. Instead, after most of the conflicts have ended, they faced a 
combination of aid of various kinds and, again, of various kinds of conditions attached to the 
financial support. Also, they lacked, for quite some time, firm commitment on the part of the 
EU on their perspective for integration. 
  These conditions led to the development of repressive institutions and repressive 
policies. Here especially the economic policy issues will be looked into. The general approach 
was to immobilize monetary policy, constrain fiscal policy and rely on trade liberalization and 
structural reforms, of which privatization and labor market reforms were thought to be the 
most important. 
  The key policy question is whether that policy mix – restrictive monetary and fiscal 
policies and radical structural reforms – is internally consistent and whether aid for 
reconstruction and institution building supports it or not? Without going into additional 
theoretical considerations, on the Balkan experience, the answer is somewhat mixed. In the 
case of Eastern Balkan countries, this mix has either not been followed strictly, in the case of 
Romania, or has, in the case of Bulgaria, in fact worked. In the Western Balkans, it has, for 
the most part, not worked. The main difference between the outcomes in Eastern and Western 
Balkans arises from the impetus for institution building that the process of EU accession 
brings in. This policy mix will not, by itself, spur institution building needed for successful 
structural reforms. Also, aid may not be conducive to structural reforms anyway. 
Lesson 2. Restrictive and even repressive economic policies have been followed and 
those have had consequences for the disappointing institutional development and growth 
performance.   12
  The main problem with the consistency between restrictive economic policy and fast 
structural reforms is that restrictiveness tends to require repressive instruments and 
institutions and that does not seat well with structural reforms based on liberalization and 
privatization. Importing institutions from the EU may help in that case, but if EU integration 
is not in sight, repressive institutions may stabilize and even spread.  
This can be seen in the development of the Western Balkans. There are several 
stylized facts about Balkan economic policies. Here, initially, exchange rate, monetary and 
fiscal policies will be considered. Later on, trade and structural policies will be looked into. 
Fixed exchange rates: The bulk of the region is on fixed exchange rates (Romania is 
an exception). Nominal rigidity is accompanied by diverse real exchange rate movements. It 
is interesting to see that in the case of some former-Yugoslavia countries, i.e., Slovenia, 
Croatia and Macedonia, real exchange rates have remained stable over a prolonged period of 
time, even in cases like Slovenia, where exchange rate was managed and mainly depreciated. 
Similar developments should be true for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro, though the 
disinflation took a bit longer in these countries. Similarly, in Bulgaria, after the introduction 
of the currency board, real exchange rate has been rather stable. 
The reasons for the policy of the stability of the exchange rate, nominal or real or both,  
that most former-Yugoslavia countries have followed are twofold. They have, on one hand, 
inherited relatively high price levels as well as relatively higher wages. On the other hand, 
they were compelled to rely on fixed exchange rates in order not to misuse the flow of 
financial aid through monetary mismanagement. That exchange rate regime, however, 
requires rather restrictive monetary and fiscal policies. 
Lesson 3. Fixed nominal and real exchange rates require convergence in inflation, 
which may put undue pressure on monetary and fiscal policies. 
Restrictive monetary policy: An advantage of the fixed exchange rate should be that a 
country pegging the currency can import the monetary policy of the anchor country. 
Assuming free flow of capital, the elimination of the exchange rate risk should lead to the 
convergence of the interest rates in the two currencies connected with the fixed exchange rate. 
That could have the effect that investments will flow to countries with higher productivity of 
capital, which should in principle be the less developed countries that are relying on the fixed 
exchange rates. In that case, significant current account deficit could emerge and persist, but 
should not lead to problems with the servicing of the foreign debt because the debt to GDP 
ratio need not increase.   13
This perhaps works for currency unions, but need not work for fixed exchange rate 
regimes. The reason is that in the system with fixed exchange rates, it may be necessary to 
keep the growth of money supply down in order to insure the convergence of the inflation 
rates. Otherwise, real appreciation of the exchange rate may create problems for the 
sustainability of the external equilibrium. Thus, it often happens that interest rates stay at a 
level well above that of the anchor country. This has three unwelcome consequences. 
For one, monetary expansion and the expansion of credits are sapped; in other words, 
monetary policy is persistently restrictive. For another, currency substitution stays high, as the 
difference between the international and the home interest rates introduces the persistent risk 
of depreciation or even surprise devaluation. Finally, higher interest rates invite foreign 
investment inflows that tend to increase the trade and current account deficits and thus may 
present problems for economic stability. 
Lesson 4. Fixed exchange rates do not lead to the adoption of the anchor country’s 
monetary policy through the convergence of interest rates, but rather to the need to implement 
restrictive monetary policy with sustained higher interest rate, which leads to lower 
employment and higher unemployment. 
Fiscal policies. Unlike monetary and exchange rate policies that do not differ all that 
much across the Balkan region, fiscal policies have diverged in a number of ways. Perhaps 
one similarity is the constant preoccupation with fiscal policy mainly because it has to be 
supportive of fixed exchange rate policy. Thus, in the region as a whole, fiscal adjustment is 
constantly on the agenda of the policy makers.  
In most cases, and especially in the case of the post-Yugoslavia states, high public 
revenues were collected in order to finance quite high levels of public expenditures. Thus, 
Serbia, Montenegro and Croatia have large public sectors. Macedonia and Albania, however, 
have low levels of public expenditures, around or just above 30 per cent of their respective 
GDPs. In the case of Macedonia, expenditures are decreasing, while in the case of Albania 
they are rising slowly reflecting slow recovery of public revenues. The intermediate case is 
Romania, where public expenditures are somewhat lower than in most other transition 
economies, but that is partly the consequence of its size, Romania being the largest economy 
in the region. Thus, in general, fiscal policy has been relied on to support macroeconomic 
stability, public expenditures have tended to be high, except in cases where they have 
collapsed, and aid for reconstruction has distorted public expenditures towards social welfare 
and away from development.   14
Lesson 5. Fiscal adjustment, i.e., low budget deficit or balanced budget, has, as a rule, 
not led to the decline of public expenditures, except in cases where public revenues have 
collapsed, and has supported distortions in the structure of budget expenditures and high and 
distorted tax burden. 
Trade policy. Initially, illiberal trade was the rule in most of the Balkans. That was the 
consequence of the wars and political disintegration. After 1999 and especially after 2000, 
trade has been gradually liberalized throughout the region. At the moment, the region as a 
whole enjoys rather liberal access to the European Union market. In addition, all the countries 
in the region have signed bilateral free-trade agreements with each other and there is an 
initiative to transform these bilateral agreements into one multilateral free-trade agreement 
creating a free-trade area in the Balkans. 
In the last few years, foreign trade both within and without the Balkan region has 
increased. That is the consequence of the fact that growth has returned to the region. Indeed, 
in the last couple of years, this has been one of the fastest growing regions in Europe. In most 
cases, this has not been an export led growth. As a rule, it has been the growth of domestic 
demand that has led to growth and to increased foreign trade. Thus, trade liberalization has 
not, at least so far, been a significant engine of growth. In a number of cases, tourism has 
contributed to growth significantly, but exports of goods have been recovering only lately and 
not too convincingly. 
Looking at the regional trade in particular, it is clear that exports of the countries of the 
region to the region have been increasing more than imports. In other words, countries in the 
region try to sell to other countries in the region, but tend to import from countries outside of 
the region. In fact, if looked into more closely, the data on regional trade seems to indicate 
that a number of countries in the region sell goods to Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, 
while the rest of the regional trade is not all that significant. It also seems not to react too 
much to trade liberalization measures. 
This, if true, would indicate that non-tariff barriers are probably more important than 
tariff barriers. It is even perhaps the case that non-trade barriers are still more important than 
all the trade barriers put together, whether tariff or non-tariff ones. Also, the factors that create 
trade opportunities may have more to do with the inflow of financial resources than with trade 
policy as such. Aid, donations and private transfers lead to increased imports and, in some 
cases, to increased exports too. 
Lesson 6. Trade policy has real limitations in the Balkans and may be rather less 
important than structural and development policy.   15
Structural policies. Development of market economy is lagging in the Balkans. This is 
the consequence of the problems with the liberalization of the economic relations, but also of 
the deficiencies in their institutionalization. The causes of this state of affairs are many and 
varied. There are problems with corporate governance, due to flawed or slow privatization, 
there are problems with labor market regulations, there are problems with public governance, 
the latter fueling especially shadow economy and corruption. Financial markets are also 
underdeveloped and repressed. Thus, there is a lot of scope for structural reforms. 
  Some of those are connected with the way state and social property was privatized and 
how it was not privatized. Privatizations have often been targeting redistribution of assets 
rather than their efficient allocation. Thus, non-standard corporate structures have emerged 
and also markets for products have been monopolized. In the region as a whole, competition 
policy hardly exists. Even if there are laws, they are not implemented. Thus, oligarchic 
structures have emerged that bring in quite a number of structural problems. 
 Perhaps  main  problems, besides privatization, are in the product and labor markets. 
The former are rather concentrated irrespective of whether they are in domestic or foreign 
ownership. The same could be said about the financial markets, especially of the banking 
sector. Labor markets are distorted in a number of ways. There are rigidities, especially in the 
public sector. There are also institutional deficiencies or outright lack of proper regulation and 
institutionalization. Also, active labor policies are either nonexistent or are not implemented 
properly. 
  Without going into details, it is enough to point out that Balkan countries are still 
among the worst ones on the various rankings of progress in transition, in competitiveness or 
in economic and overall liberty. 
  Lesson 7. The deficiencies in privatizations, the nonexistence of competition and 
active labor policies are the main structural deficiencies in the Balkans. 
 
4.3. Conclusion on policy design 
  International political and economic involvement has had positive consequences for 
the overall security in the aid recipient states and in the region as a whole, but often negative 
institutional and developmental consequences in the Balkans. Also, economic policies that 
were advised and supported have had some positive effects for the stability, but rather less so 
for the development and growth in this region. It is an open question whether the main reason 
was the lack of coherence between the aid effort that targeted mainly security and social 
stability with the transitional agenda that targeted institutional change and structural reform.   16
 
5. Aid and institutional development: a different example 
  Most of what was said above refers to the aid effort that was directed towards post-war 
and post-conflict reconstruction. In the last few years, however, the focus has shifted towards 
regional cooperation and European Union (EU) integration. The experience in other regions in 
transition suggests that EU integration has significant effects on the development and growth 
prospects of these countries. It is sometimes argued that this is the consequence of the 
institutional development that integration brings together with the improvement in policies 
that increasing integration brings or suggests. It is argued by others that this is the 
consequence of the significant funds that the EU disburses during the pre-accession period 
and also after the accession takes place. 
  Stylized facts, however, can be read differently too. Many studies suggest that it is 
precisely the institutional development that is the slowest in transition countries. The usual 
indicators of rule of law, democratization and public governance tend to show that progress is 
rather slower than is the overall economic growth. Also, it is not altogether clear whether the 
transfers from the EU for regional, agricultural and the development of social cohesion do 
have the positive effects that are attributed to them.  
  One thing, however, stands out. The success of the central European transition 
economies that have joined the EU in 2004 is connected with the significant role that the 
access to the EU market has had and the significant inflow of foreign investments that helped 
the reindustrialization of this region. So, the main help that EU integration seems to have had 
to transition economies has been the increased market integration that it has provided.  
  Similar developments can be observed in the Balkans. It is clear that there is a 
relationship between the prospects for EU integration and the speed of development in the 
whole Balkan area. The main mechanism has to do with the flow of private investments rather 
than with aid. It is not difficult to see how this works. Countries that are integrating with the 
EU tend to experience falling risk to investments. These countries, being in general much 
less-developed, offer significant productivity gains and thus high returns to capital. Thus, 
declining risks with high returns to capital lead to significant inflows of investments that lift 
the growth rate. The macroeconomic imbalances that develop, often temporarily but 
sometimes for a longer period of time, tend not to produce problems because of the high 
growth rate. Thus, this growth tends to be sustainable.  
  The main question is why is risk falling in these countries? One explanation is that it is 
because of the anticipated institutional and policy improvement. Thus, it can be argued, it is   17
not the existing but it is the expected institutions that are the driving force of sustainable 
growth in transition economies. Similar developments could be seen in the Balkans, though in 
the cases that are of interest here, progress is rather slow still. 
 
6. Conclusion 
  These two examples suggest that it may be the case that aid is good for reconstruction 
purposes, but it is the expectations of institutional clarity and responsible policies that are 
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